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DOES STEWARDSHIP STILL HAVE A ROLE?1  
 
 
 
Abstract: The paper analyzes the decision of FASB and IASB not to treat the 
motivational and control aspects of stewardship as a separate and distinct 
reporting objective to that of facilitating investment decisions. It does so firstly 
by considering the demand for information to control agents; and secondly by 
assessing the capacity of decision-useful information to replicate stewardship 
effects. The paper finds an essence to accounting based on the legal protection 
of property rights, encompassing stewardship, which has remained constant 
since earliest times. The decision taken by the boards on stewardship also 
appears disconnected from changes in the capital markets as well as the 
writings on reporting objectives that preceded it.     
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The paper focuses on the decisions of FASB and IASB to adopt the provision of 
decision-useful information to investors as the sole objective of financial reporting in their 
respective conceptual frameworks (CF); stewardship information being seen as valuable only 
in so far as it contributes to this overall aim. This view was articulated by the two boards in 
FASB Concepts Statement No. 8 (CS#8), also known as Chapters 1 and 3 of the IASB’s 
Conceptual Framework. CS#8 still stands in the U.S. and there are currently no plans to 
revise it. IASB, for its part, is pressing ahead with a revised CF, but still sees stewardship as 
part of the decision-usefulness role rather than as separate and distinct [IASB, 2015a, 1.2; 
2015b, BC1.9]. Hence, the issue which the paper investigates is whether the stance of the two 
boards on stewardship is tenable from an historical perspective.2 In so doing, it clarifies 
                                                 
1 We would like to express our thanks to two anonymous referees for their extensive comments, which 
significantly improved the paper. 
2 How this situation came about despite voluminous protests from stakeholders is considered in Zeff [2013] and 
Pelger [2016]. See also Young [2006]. Arguably, it is an example of the type of unscientific behaviour described 
by Basu [2015]. One of the criticisms is that the boards are assuming a one-to-one correspondence between the 
economic substance of an event and its reporting, without considering the incentive effects produced when 
managers have access to the information reported in the accounts [Christensen, 1981; Gao, 2013].  
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exactly what type of information has been overlooked by the boards in their downgrading of 
stewardship, which was a cause of confusion in the discussions leading to CS#8 [Pelger, 
2016]. The findings challenge Miller and Napier’s [1993] assertion that there is no essence to 
accounting. Instead, the paper argues in favor of a legal essence based on proving property 
rights and obligations incorporating stewardship, the demand for which has remained 
constant since earliest times. 
An interesting point is that by subsuming stewardship within the single objective of 
providing forward-looking information to facilitate investment decisions, the two boards are 
out of step with the economic theory of accounting concerning the value of information. 
According to this theory, there are two main characteristics of financial accounting 
information, the one relating to informing decisions and the other to controlling agents. The 
boards consider only the decision-usefulness role as valuable. The other characteristic, which 
involves controlling and motivating agents through legally binding reporting arrangements, is 
the aspect of stewardship ignored by the boards despite its being arguably one of financial 
accounting’s main functions. Hence, notwithstanding Merino’s observation that “mainstream 
accounting research often focuses on economic models in which assumptions bear no 
reflection to existing conditions,” [Lazdowski, 2015, p. 7], in this instance, the evidence from 
accounting history and mainstream accounting theory are consistent with each other. 
Notable recent historical contributions relating to the CF include Williams [2003], 
who traces the acceptance of the definition of assets as future economic benefits, which she 
argues has resulted in a loss of practical relevance;3 and Basu and Waymire [2010], who 
identify flaws in the arguments of Robert Sprouse in the 1960s that helped steer FASB 
towards its present balance sheet view of income measurement.  
                                                 
3 The definition of assets adopted in the joint CF of FASB/IASB [2010, 4.4] is now “…a resource controlled by 
the entity as a result of past events and from which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the entity.” 
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Bryer [2013] regards the balance sheet approach as “pathological” because it views 
income as a product of the underlying value of the net assets rather than the costs expended in 
production. Tracing the idea back through a succession of accounting theorists to the seminal 
work of Irving Fisher at the turn of the 20th century, he contends that Fisher’s main 
motivation for adopting a balance sheet perspective was ideological rather than theoretical; 
i.e. to disprove the validity of Marx’s labor theory of value that was gaining credence in U.S. 
intellectual circles at this time.  
Zeff [2013] provides a detailed historical analysis of the antecedents of the present 
CF, including the evolution of the concepts of stewardship, conservatism and prudence. 
Zimmerman [2015] agrees with Zeff that “stewardship as a consequential factor seems to 
have receded into the background” [Zeff, 2013, p. 313], dating the start of the change to the 
1930s when markets in the U.S. were first regulated. He contends that from that point on, 
“the role of financial accounting shifted away from its stewardship roots and toward 
providing these public markets with information for valuation” [Zimmerman, 2015, p. 487]. 
However, Zimmerman [2015] also argues the converse is true of the present, predicting a 
greater demand for stewardship information in the 21st century in order to resolve the 
additional conflicts of interest resulting from the large rise in private equity and venture 
capital financing in the modern, knowledge-based economy.    
For Macve [2014, p. 11], accounting practice is based on conventions that “evolved at 
different times and places for different reasons.” Accordingly, the central question that 
policy-makers should be addressing is how appropriate time-honored conventions are to the 
modern business world, rather than over-arching concepts as reflected in the CF [see also 
Bromwich et al., 2010]. In order to achieve this aim, one would first need to understand the 
circumstances surrounding the origins of the practices that through time became conventional 
and then to consider how those circumstances have changed, thus elevating the importance of 
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accounting history. Macve [2015, pp. 124, 138] illustrates this argument further in a wide-
ranging study from ancient to modern times exposing the notion of objectivity in accounting 
and auditing as “twin rational myths.” Basu [2015, p. 1] similarly argues in favor of the 
“scientific laws” that are embedded through “evolved accounting practice” over the 
“unscientific ideology” of much of “recent accounting research, regulation and teaching.” 
FASB stands accused by Markarian [2014] of ignoring the debates of the early 20th 
century on valuation in their pursuit of fair values and downgrading of “reliability.” 4 Finally, 
Nurnberg [2015] provides a “market for excuses” explanation along the lines of Watts and 
Zimmerman [1979] for the narrowing of perceptions by U.S. standard setters over the last 45 
years in relation to the primary users and basic objectives served by financial reporting. 
Essentially, he sees the narrowing of scope of the present CS#8 as working in favor of the 
preparers, auditors and regulators because it reduces the number of areas they can be held 
accountable for by “investors, creditors, other stakeholders, and society as a whole,” hence 
allowing management greater freedom of action [p. 77]. 
The main contribution of the present study to the CF debate is that it examines the 
historical demand for accounting information and the uses to which it has been put prior to 
the advent of mandatory reporting. Thus, the study eliminates regulatory compliance as an 
explanatory factor, a tactic employed by Benston [1969, 1973], Chow [1982], Sivakumar and 
Waymire [1993, 1994, 2003], Ely and Waymire [1999a, 1999b] and Barton and Waymire 
[2004].  Accounting history’s potential in this regard was recognized by Napier [1989], but 
generally it has not been fulfilled in debates over contemporary practice.5 
The paper does not consider the development of government accounting which is 
outside the remit of CS#8. While there is considerable overlap between this topic and some of 
                                                 
4 See also Erb and Pelger [2015] for a similar view, tracing the evolution of “reliability” in the CFs and how the 
term has been redefined in order to take financial reporting further in the direction of fair values. 
5 Historical studies are conspicuous by their absence from the comprehensive literature review undertaken by 
the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group [2013] of the use of information by capital providers. 
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the procedures we discuss – the influence of estate practice on the development of medieval 
Exchequer accounting is an example [Jones, 2009] – the notion of stewardship in government 
is also conflated with issues of political power that do not apply to general purpose financial 
reporting, such as the protection of constitutional liberties through financial controls [Funnell, 
2007, 2008].    
The paper proceeds by briefly clarifying the aspect of stewardship omitted from 
CS#8. The economic theory is useful because it provides a well-developed framework for 
explaining the differences. The paper then turns its attention to the demand for stewardship 
information to motivate and control agents in the pre-regulation period. How capable 
decision-useful information has proved in also performing a stewardship role is then 
discussed. Finally, the paper considers the general applicability of its findings to the modern 
era. 
 
MOTIVATIONAL AND CONTROL CHARACTERISTICS OF STEWARDSHIP 
INFORMATION 
 
One of the most controversial aspects of CS#8 is the subsuming of stewardship within 
the single objective of providing forward-looking financial reporting information to facilitate 
investment decision-making [FASB, 2010, BC1.24-28]. Proponents of stewardship as a 
distinct objective of financial reporting failed to convince FASB members in particular that a 
stewardship perspective would make any difference in practice [Pelger, 2016]. Part of the 
difficulty revolved around the lack of a standard definition of the term and the fact that 
stewardship information can indeed be useful to investors in assessing future cash flows [ibid, 
p. 61]. Hence, Zeff [2013, p. 313] is inclined to agree with the boards “that stewardship 
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should be folded into the overall decision-usefulness objective” if one interprets stewardship 
as “an indicator of management effectiveness in generating a return to shareholders.” 
Yet recognition of this overlap does not mean that stewardship information cannot be 
distinguished from decision-useful information. What is missing from the boards’ 
interpretation of stewardship are the motivational and control aspects of stewardship 
information – i.e. information for influencing agents to act in accordance with the principal’s 
wishes as opposed to information for facilitating investment decisions – and it is this 
omission which is the focus of the current study. 
There can be little doubt that these two types of accounting information are 
conceptually distinct, given that they perform different roles.6 Stewardship information is 
used to control the activities of agents when the interests of a principal and agent are in 
conflict and there is uncertainty about how the agent will act. Information is then used to 
align those interests through the provision of incentives based on outcome data [Christensen 
and Feltham, 2008].7 By way of contrast, the decision-usefulness role exists to help investors 
take better decisions in the presence of uncertainty about future outcomes.  
Furthermore, the determinants of the value of information in the two cases are 
different. For information to be decision-useful, important determinants are relevance and 
timing, and verifiability contributes to value; but for stewardship information, decision-
relevance and timing are less important, and verifiability assumes a greater significance [Ijiri, 
1971; Gjesdal, 1981]. Relevance means the potential of information to alter a decision, which 
is clearly necessary for the information to be useful to investors. Timeliness is also key, as 
information loses its potency to affect decisions if it is received too late. But as far as the 
stewardship role is concerned, information can be produced retrospectively without it losing 
                                                 
6 See Feltham [1972], Demski [1980], Strong and Walker [1989], Laffont and Martimort [2002], Christensen 
and Demski [2003], Christensen and Feltham [2003], and Christensen and Feltham [2008] for elaboration on the 
two types of accounting information. 
7 Ijiri [1983] and Ball [1989] presented a similar analysis in the development of alternative conceptual 
frameworks. 
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its incentive effects. In this situation, managers act appropriately, not because they have more 
timely or relevant information, but because they are motivated by the prospect of future 
performance evaluation. Verifiability, on the other hand, is of primary importance to 
stewardship in the design of agent rewards. Without verifiability, a contract becomes 
unenforceable in the courts, thus lessening the incentive properties of the information 
produced [Arrow 1983; Laffont and Martimort 2002, Ch. 6]. For these reasons, information 
that is valuable for investment decisions will not necessarily be valuable for stewardship 
purposes, and vice versa.  
The question addressed in the remainder of the paper is whether these conceptual 
distinctions matter in practice, focusing next on the historical demand for stewardship 
information to control agents.  
 
HISTORICAL DEMAND FOR STEWARDSHIP INFORMATION 
 
If FASB’s and IASB’s stance regarding the objectives of financial reporting can be 
challenged on conceptual grounds, the boards’ position might nonetheless remain tenable if 
there was little demand from capital providers, the class of accounts-users the boards 
prioritize,  for stewardship information to control agents. However, this is not the case.  
Arguably, the demand for stewardship information to deter agents from undesirable 
behavior is self-evident given the contemporary international focus on corporate governance 
arrangements and the frequency of accounting scandals [Clarke et al., 2003; Lee, 2006]. 
There is also an abundance of academic research attesting to the demand for information to 
control agents in the present-day [e.g. Watts, 1977; Healy, 1985; Lambert, 1984; Lambert and 
Larcker, 1985; Dye, 1988; Watts and Zimmerman 1978, 1990].  
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But, it is to history that one must turn to appreciate the significance and longevity of 
the demand for stewardship information. In this regard, the study of origins is particularly 
illuminating, as the circumstances surrounding the origins of a practice can reveal something 
about its intrinsic nature. This view runs contrary to Miller and Napier’s [1993] Foucauldian, 
genealogical perspective that rejects universal historical truths and emphasizes the historical 
contingency of events. However, some transcendent historical truths are not in question, such 
as competition between humans for resources, the existence of differential property rights in 
most societies, and the imperative of individuals and organizations to protect their interests,8 
which the paper argues lies at the root of the demand by business owners for stewardship 
information to incentivize agents and hold them to account for their utilization of the owners’ 
resources.  
Moreover, the historical evidence is valuable because it covers the period prior to 
mandatory reporting. Therefore, regulatory pressure is not a factor when attempting to infer 
the nature of user-demand from observed reporting practices. Evidence from early agency 
contexts reveals concerns about conflicts of interest between principals and agents, 
asymmetric information, and the importance of using verifiable information to assess how 
well agents had performed their obligations, if necessary tested in the courts. All of these are 
features of the demand for stewardship information to control the behavior of managers.  
The association between accounting and the protection/enforcement of property 
entitlements and obligations has been a perennial feature of most societies since the first 
cultivation of crops and the domestication of livestock in the Middle East c.8000-3000BC. 
One of the principal features of settled agricultural society compared to bands of hunter-
gatherers is the existence of property in the form of land and surplus. This has various 
ramifications, including differential levels of ownership and reckoning technologies to track 
                                                 
8 See Brown [1991] for an anthropological reflection on “human universals.” Interestingly, he sees biology 
rather than culture as the main determinant of human universals, and in particular the evolution of the human 
mind [p. 6].  
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economic exchanges and enforce obligations [Oldroyd and Miller, 2011]. Throughout history 
accounting has performed this vital role, without which trading could not have taken place.9 
The concentration of investment and the sharing of risks through the creation of joint-
stock companies in the 16th and 17th centuries is a case in point. It was accountability 
systems that made this new form of business organization possible by reducing the risk of 
entrusting funds to third-party agents whose actions could not be directly observed, as well as 
ensuring that investors received the dues to which they were entitled [Oldroyd and Miller, 
2011]. The earliest example in the English-speaking world is the Company of Merchant 
Adventurers of England for the Discovery of Lands Unknown (later known as the Russia 
Company), which was formed in 1552 to discover a northerly trading route to China. The 
formation of a joint-stock company, with each subscriber contributing £25 (equivalent to 
about $12,000 today in purchasing power), enabled this high-risk venture to proceed 
[Hakluyt, 1927, pp. 241-267, 319]. The company failed in its original objective, but 
nonetheless succeeded in establishing trading links with Russia. Although accounts have not 
survived, the first set was prepared in 1567 for the preceding fifteen years for the express 
purpose of paying the shareholders their dues in dividends [Willan, 1956]. 
Investors in the Dutch East-India Company in the period 1602-1623 required a form 
of accounting that would deter agents from acting dishonestly. Interestingly, there was no 
demand from investors for the provision of profit measurements from the Company, which 
was the largest capitalist enterprise at the time. Investors could calculate their own returns 
based on the cash subscriptions and disbursements, but sought “a proper accounting in the 
manner of a steward” from the directors, whom they suspected were “guilty of 
maladministration, fraud, and unethical practices” [Robertson and Funnell, 2012].  
                                                 
9 Corroborating evidence that recordkeeping promotes exchanges was obtained via a repeated trust game 
experiment [Basu, Dickhaut, Hecht, Towry and Waymire, 2009].  
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From earliest times, the main rationale for accounting has been to facilitate trade and 
investment through this ability to attest property rights and obligations. Studies by accounting 
historians confirm that in general this state of affairs has remained constant.10 Mercantile 
accounting, medieval manors, and Victorian landed estates are but three examples [e.g. 
Ramsey, 1956; Napier, 1991; Harvey, 1994]. Without accounting systems that are capable of 
tracking transactions and enforcing rights and obligations, trade would be impracticable 
except on the smallest scale. Put the other way-round, for accounting to fulfil its role of 
protecting property, it must be capable of reporting events at a distance, both physical and 
temporal. 
This facet of financial accounting practice has been evident since its origins in 
prehistory. According to Schmandt-Besserat [1992, p. 160], the earliest notational 
inscriptions on antler bones represented a cognitive leap for mankind precisely because they 
enabled “concrete information” to be translated into “abstract markings”, and “knowledge” to 
be separated from the “knower.”  The first unequivocal accounting records – a system of clay 
tokens in ancient Mesopotamia predating the invention of writing by several thousand years – 
are therefore significant because they allowed economic events to be communicated at a 
distance apart from by word of mouth.  
Basu and Waymire [2006] see the discovery of recordkeeping as an extension of the 
process of human evolution because it “expanded memory capacity far beyond the biological 
constraints of the human brain” [p. 204], and allowed “complex cooperative arrangements” to 
develop [p. 203].11 This was not just a one-stage process, but a reciprocal one in which 
“formal recordkeeping, language, law, and other exchange-supporting institutions co-evolve 
                                                 
10 This is not simply a western phenomenon. Peng and Brown [2015] contrasted the broader focus of traditional 
Chinese reporting models with that of western practice in the Quīng Dynasty, but tracking property rights and 
obligations was nonetheless central to the Chinese model [p. 4]. 
11 See also Waymire and Basu [2007, p. 95]. Basu, Kirk, and Waymire [2009] tested the association between the 
incidence of recordkeeping and the size and complexity of societies from an anthropological database. They 
found that the likelihood of recordkeeping increases for large groups and that it precedes the appearance of 
administrative and legal institutions.  
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and feed back to facilitate even more complex forms of exchange” [p. 212]. Ezzamel and 
Hoskin [2002, p. 360] likewise theorize the emergence of accounting, writing and money in 
the ancient world as a process of change, creating concepts such as “transaction”, 
“equivalence” and “value reciprocity” which previously had no meaning.  
Distance from events, or more precisely asymmetric information, has continued to 
influence the development of accounting ever since. For example, the rationale for the charge 
and discharge system on medieval estates was the problem of managing geographically 
dispersed operations, given that secular lords or monasteries commonly owned estates in 
different regions or even countries, and that individual estates were themselves composed of 
different units of production [Harvey 1994; Dobie, 2008].  
Merchants trading overseas encountered similar difficulties in controlling their 
operations at a distance. According to Hooper [1995], the diversification of English 
merchants into overseas markets in the second half of the 15th century explains why they 
switched from oral to written accountability; while in Italy, firms of merchants and bankers 
relied on accounts to control their Europe-wide networks of branches [Lee, 1977; Carruthers 
and Espeland, 1991]. 
The internationalization of English trade continued apace in the 16th century, 
widening the network of agents and factors, and increasing the need for accounts for purposes 
of control. It was for this reason that letters and abstracts sent by post became vital to 
merchants because they provided a more flexible and timely information source for control 
over wider distances than the account-books [Yamey et al. 1963, pp. 21, 25, 44, 48, 97; 
Oldroyd, 1998]. 
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Both stewardship accounting and record-keeping are premised on the need for owners 
to protect their property entitlements at a distance.12 In the case of stewardship accounting, it 
becomes necessary to utilize intermediaries to act on the owners’ behalf either because they 
are unwilling or unable to look after their own affairs, or because the scale and complexity of 
the operations renders direct supervision by the owners impracticable. Stewardship 
accounting supplements recordkeeping in deterring inappropriate managerial behavior, but 
the prime motivation of safeguarding the owners’ property is the same. Hence, auditors who 
report to the shareholders on the overall view shown by the accounts are also obliged to 
check that the accounts are in agreement with the underlying accounting records.   
18th century landed estates in the north-east of England provide a good illustration of 
these two complementary aspects of financial accounting. The region was the first in Britain 
to industrialize on a significant scale, fed primarily by an increase in demand for coal in 
London and the south-east of England. Landowners like the Bowes in County Durham stood 
at the forefront of industrial expansion. Various modes of organizational control were 
employed in the estates including partnerships, external and internal subcontractors, leasing 
arrangements, and direct management. Local supply networks were created for tools, 
machinery, horses, wagonway-construction and track maintenance. Estate stewards oversaw 
the operations that were spread over wide areas. However, there was a commonality between 
the performance evaluation of stewards and the recording of transactions in the sense that all 
the activities were underlain by detailed accounting evidence channeled through the one 
estate office, including returns by the stewards supported by vouchers. In this way, the two 
chief stewards, who were in turn accountable to the proprietor, were able to ensure that the 
subsidiary stewards had acted honestly and diligently, that third-parties had fulfilled their 
                                                 
12 Waymire [2009] argues that a still more fundamental demand exists for “exchange guidance” than either 
stewardship or valuation information will provide, such as at the point of origin of a firm when information is 
needed to find markets, secure supplies and get businesses up and running.  
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contractual obligations, and that in all cases, the proprietor had received his proper dues 
[Oldroyd, 2007, Ch. 2, 3].   
The protection and enforcement of property entitlements and obligations is so 
elemental to the structure of capitalist society that Funnell [2001] equates it to the concept of 
“justice”.13 Hence, William Blackstone, the foremost commentator on English common law 
in the 18th century, whose Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-1769) played a key 
role in the drafting of the American Constitution, saw the preservation of property as the 
ultimate end of justice [Oldroyd, 2007, p. 68]. He maintained that “there is nothing which so 
generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of 
property” [Blackstone, 1826, p. 1]. Following John Locke, Blackstone believed that 
protection of property was the reason why humans had originally formed themselves into 
societies. This explained why the English legislature  
had universally promoted the grand ends of civil society, the peace and 
security of individuals, by steadily pursuing that wise and orderly maxim, of 
assigning to everything capable of ownership a legal and determinate owner 
[ibid., p. 14].  
 
For this reason, financial accounting is important not simply through its ability to track 
property rights, but because in theory it provides the necessary evidence to allow owners to 
enforce those rights in courts of law. In other words, financial accounting has proved useful 
historically because of its property of verifiability.  
The use of accounts as legal evidence has been a continual feature of Western 
civilization since the ancient Greeks and Romans [Oldroyd and Dobie, 2009]. Basu and 
Waymire [2006] observe the same was true of ancient Mesopotamia, where legal systems co-
evolved with recordkeeping to resolve ex post disputes.14 Likewise, the main purpose of the 
accounts of English merchants in the 16th and 17th centuries was to provide a complete 
                                                 
13 De Soto [2001] has argued that differences in property record systems explain why capitalism has succeeded 
in the West but not in underdeveloped countries. 
14 The Babylonian Code of Hammurabi (c. 1750 BC) is an example.  
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record of their transactions, enforceable in law. The printed guidance available to them at the 
time echoed earlier Italian texts in asserting that the reasons for keeping accounts were to 
eliminate errors, prevent fraud, calculate the probate value of businesses, track personal 
accounts, inventory and partners’ capital, and provide evidence in courts of law [Yamey et al. 
1963; Carruthers and Espeland, 1991; Oldroyd 1998; Sangster, 2016; 2017].  
This need for principals to protect their property entitlements at a distance explains 
the existence of legally enforceable control mechanisms to hold agents accountable. Effective 
control of agents cannot exist without accountability, and effective accountability is 
dependent on verifiable evidence that ultimately can be tested in court. A notable feature of 
the management of 18th century estates in the north-east of England, for example, was the 
legal underpinning of the business arrangements with written contracts supported by accounts 
to monitor compliance [Oldroyd, 2007, p. 81]. Company directors today have a legal 
obligation to provide the auditors and ultimately the courts with sufficient evidence relating 
to their company’s activities.  
The labor contract system established by the Freedmen’s Bureau in the former 
Confederacy in wake of the American Civil War is an example where the relationship 
between verifiability and accountability broke down. The principal-agent relationship was 
complex in that the plantation owners were themselves acting as intermediaries on behalf of 
the U.S. government to provide their former slaves, now employees, with their lawful dues 
under their contracts. The basis for resolving disputes was accounting evidence heard before 
tribunals and local courts. However, the system proved untenable from the outset owing to 
the lack of audit of the employers’ figures allied to a prejudiced and ineffectual judicial 
process, and was instrumental in the ex-slaves continued servitude [Fleischman et al., 2014]. 
In summary, the historical evidence from the pre-regulation period suggests that the 
demand for stewardship information to influence the behavior of agents by holding them to 
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account, which CS#8 ignores, is the product of financial accounting’s three most elemental 
properties: property entitlements where there are potential conflicts of interest, controlling 
events at a distance or asymmetric information, and legal evidence or verifiability. Whilst not 
denying the possibility of change in other respects or the significance of contingent historical 
forces in shaping events, the perennial nature of these three elements belies Miller and 
Napier’s [1993] assertion that there is no essence to accounting.  
 
ABILITY OF DECISION-USEFUL INFORMATION TO REPLICATE STEWARDSHIP 
EFFECTS 
 
The previous section considered the demand for stewardship information in isolation, 
but it may be possible for the same piece of information to produce overlapping decision-
useful and stewardship effects. In that case, the standards boards might still be vindicated in 
excluding stewardship as an objective from the CF. It is therefore significant that 
contemporary and historical research has examined settings in which this condition appears to 
have been satisfied, and decision-useful information has played a stewardship role and vice 
versa.  
A number of studies highlight the complementary effects of the two information types 
in the present-day,15 and the examples that follow show that the same is true historically. 
However, the argument that information intended primarily for informing decisions is 
capable of fully replicating stewardship effects and therefore acting as a substitute falls down 
historically for two main reasons: the first relating to the primacy of the demand for 
information to protect property rights and thereby hold agents to account identified in the 
                                                 
15 See, for example, Wolfson [1985]; Bushman et al. [2006]; Ball and Shivakumar [2008]; Banker et al. [2009]; 
Kothari et al [2010]; Peng [2011]; Heinle and Hofmann [2011], Drymiotes and Hemmer [2013]. 
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previous section; and the second, to the need for such information to be capable of 
verification in order for it to be fully effective. 
Taking the user-demand issue first, the historical preeminence of stewardship 
information means that where decision-useful information has been utilized for stewardship 
purposes in the past, this normally has occurred within a pre-established framework of 
accountability reporting as a supplement to the existing arrangements. It has therefore tended 
to provide an incremental contribution to accountability within the organization rather than 
acted as a substitute, as the two boards now envisage. For example, the regular practice of 
surveying estates’ possessions, revenues and annual gross product from the medieval period 
onwards was useful for planning, whilst at the same time providing a benchmark against 
which the stewards’ biannual returns could be judged [Oldroyd and Dobie, 2009]. In this 
manner, the surveys augmented accountability within the organization, but did not obviate the 
need for audited charge and discharge accounts. The same was true of the Bowes estates in 
the 1750s where opportunity-cost calculations were used to evaluate the performance of a 
lead-mine manager as a supplement to the regular accounting arrangements [Oldroyd, 2007, 
pp. 186-187].  
Similarly, the costing records of the General Mining Association in Canada in the 
19th century, the main purpose of which was to control costs and inform capital investment 
decisions, acted as a supplementary control of managers alongside the regular financial 
accounts. The directors, who were based in London, felt seriously disadvantaged by their 
distance from the company’s operations, and compensated for their inability to witness the 
operations first-hand by investigating even the most “trifling” items of expenditure in the 
costing returns sent back from Canada [Fleischman and Oldroyd, 2001, p. 45]. Another 
example is Josiah Wedgwood’s investigation of his costs and profit margins, which he later 
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used in pricing decisions. These revealed a history of dishonesty on the part of his head-clerk, 
resulting in his dismissal [McKendrick, 1970; Miller, 1989]. 
In most cases, the overlap of information characteristics has occurred the other way 
round, with stewardship information being utilized to inform a wider set of decisions. 
Medieval estate accounting is a case in point. In order to perform their accountability 
function, the stewards’ accounts contained an “enormous amount of detailed information” 
that could be utilized for other purposes. At Norwich Cathedral Priory they were used to 
inform leasing decisions in the early 14th century [Harvey, 1994, pp. 95-96]. At Durham 
Cathedral Priory they were useful in planning the production of bread and ale [Dobie, 2011]. 
An analysis of treatises on double-entry bookkeeping (c.1547-1799) confirms that 
merchants were aware of the potential of their accounts for facilitating decisions [Edwards et 
al., 2009]. Hence, although the letters demanded by 16th century English merchants of their 
factors served primarily to hold them to account, the scope of the information conveyed by 
the factors was wider, thereby forming the basis of a range of business decisions, such as 
which commodities to buy and sell [Oldroyd, 1998]. 
Finally, Chow [1982] predicted and found evidence from the unregulated U.S. 
environment of 1926 that companies which voluntarily engaged auditors to verify their 
accounts benefited from better loan terms by signaling the future behavior of managers in 
protecting bondholders’ interests. 
The second reason why decision-useful information is unlikely to be capable of fully 
replicating stewardship effects is that achieving that level of assurance requires information 
which is capable of verification. 16 This is consistent with the economic theory noted above, 
which emphasizes the importance of verifiability for effective stewardship, the contracting 
process being a prime example [Shivakumar, 2013, p. 379]. However, verifiability is 
                                                 
16 See also Barclay et al. [2005], Demerjian [2011] and Ball et al. [2015]. It is also reflected in the legal 
regulation that obliges auditors to base their opinion on verifiable evidence [Craig et al., 2017]. 
19 
 
inevitably problematic for decision-useful information, as this must necessarily be forwards 
looking in order to be relevant, which introduces the added uncertainty of predicting the 
future. An example is valuing assets and liabilities in relation to future economic benefits, 
which Edwards et al. [2009, p. 562] describe as an “age old” problem that has proved 
“intractable” throughout history [Edwards, 1996, p. 64; Dean, 2010].17  
History is replete with examples of the negative consequences arising when the 
verifiability of accounting data is compromised.18 The paper has already commented on the 
lack of verifiability in the accounting system established after the American Civil War to 
protect the contractual rights of former slaves, which resulted in their widespread 
exploitation. Similarly, the reliability of the information merchants received from their 
factors by post could be compromised in the absence of corroboration. The English Tudor 
merchant, John Johnson is an example. He relied on his brother to act as his agent in Calais 
and keep him apprised of events, but by the time he found out the true and dire state of the 
business through an indirect source, it was too late to take corrective action and bankruptcy 
ensued [Oldroyd, 1998].  
Lee [2006] cites a catalogue of reporting scandals and resultant legislation in the U.S. 
and Britain, stretching back to the 19th century, to support his argument that a perpetual war 
is being waged between the protectors of the public interest in capital markets – notably the 
“auditors, legislators, government regulators and academics” [p. 420] – and those corporate 
managers who regard the information in financial reports as their private property. The 
“deceit” of the latter is only made possible because of the “subjective, flexible, and 
                                                 
17 For example, the issue of whether to measure assets at cost or value was discussed in early bookkeeping 
treatises particularly in relation to inventory [Edwards et al., 2009]. Governmental codes in France and Germany 
reveal a competition between the use of cost and market value dating back to the 17th century [Richard, 2005]. 
Socio-economic and political factors explain how each method was tried and rejected and tried again in 
Germany during the 19th and 20th centuries [Hoffmann and Detzen, 2013]. Walker [1992] relates how the SEC 
used its influence during the 1930s, 40s and 50s to discourage the “improper” practice of upward revaluations of 
fixed assets.  
18 In extreme cases, entire markets can be affected, such as the freeze in interbank lending during the 2007/2009 
financial crisis, which was precipitated by a lack of assurance on the part of lenders about the creditworthiness 
of counterparties as well as strength of their own balance sheets and capacity to lend [Cecchetti, 2009]. 
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inconsistent rules that permit the reporting of accounting numbers with ambiguous economic 
meaning,” making them difficult to challenge [p. 421].19 Clarke et al. [2003] came to a 
similar conclusion from their analysis of Australian corporate collapses from the 1960s 
onwards. In more recent times, the use of internally generated estimated values in financial 
reporting was an important element in the Enron bankruptcy case [Benston and Hartgraves, 
2002; Benston, 2006, 2008; Gwilliam and Jackson, 2008], all of which speaks of the 
importance of verifiability in achieving high quality stewardship effects.   
The issue of verifiability and its implications for the recognition and valuation of 
assets and liabilities – with knock on effects for income measurement, capital maintenance, 
and manager and debtholder contract variables – lies at the heart of answering the question 
posed by FASB members in the discussions concerning CS#8 over what would differ “as a 
result of including a stewardship/accountability perspective” as well as a decision-usefulness 
one [Zeff, 2013, pp. 307-308]. 
 
GENERAL APPLICABILITY OF THE FINDINGS 
  
There is inevitably a danger of making inappropriate connections in any generalized 
explanations of human behavior. Stevelinck [1985, p. 4], for example, maintains that “the 
accounts of the ancient world tell us very little [about the present], the economic environment 
then having been so very different from our own that no valid comparisons can be effected.” 
Previts and Bricker [1994] caution researchers against applying capital market methods to 
data from historical time periods without fully considering the business/finance environment 
of the period.20 Likewise, Hopwood [1987, p. 208] criticizes authors who “have tended to see 
it [accounting] and study it in ways that are disconnected from the contexts in which it 
                                                 
19 See Blancheton [2012] for an example of manipulation by a central bank where the complexity of the 
monetary relations made verifiability problematic. 
20 In particular, they warn against researchers falling into the trap of “presentmindedness” by unguardedly 
applying modern-day assumptions of market efficiency to archival data [p. 626].    
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operates.” His assertion that “accounting has and still does become what it is not” has been 
developed by researchers in a variety of contexts [e.g. Hoskin and Macve, 2000]. Writing 
from a Foucauldian, genealogical perspective, Miller and Napier [1993], stress the 
transformative nature of accounting practice.  
Such concerns are relevant to the current study given that its claims relating to the 
ongoing significance of stewardship information are based on evidence drawn primarily from 
the pre-regulation period. The question is whether that significance has diminished 
subsequently with the development of modern capital markets and globally dispersed 
investors to the extent that it can now be dispensed with as a financial reporting objective. 
Probably suspecting the answer to be yes,21 “Does stewardship (accountability) still have a 
role?” is the second of some thirty “cross-cutting issues” identified by FASB and IASB in a 
communications paper issued at the commencement of their joint CF project [Bullen and 
Crook, 2005, p. 14].22  
However, there are problems with this analysis from an historical perspective. The 
first difficulty is that the capital markets experienced continual change throughout the 20th 
century, and are continuing to do so in the 21st. Hence, the trade in securities is undoubtedly 
different now compared to say 1900, but given the scale and frequency of the changes, it 
would be difficult to identify the hypothetical tipping-point when developments within the 
market place rendered stewardship information so insignificant in the minds of investors that 
it could be dispensed with. 
                                                 
21 Whittington [2008, p. 499] attributes the dominance of decision-usefulness over stewardship in the U.S. to the 
strength of its capital-markets tradition and inherent belief in the ability of markets to discipline management 
through measures such as “the threat of take-over and the rewards of stock options and other market-related 
payments.”   
22 By way of contrast, Zimmerman [2015, p. 503] argues that the value of decision-useful information depends 
on the provision of stewardship information because “…there is little to value unless the incentives of the key 
stakeholders are aligned.” See also the discussant’s view on his paper: “In terms of stewardship, that will always 
be important… Unfettered capitalism certainly does not work and we absolutely need stewardship. I think we 
can all agree on that” [Williams, 2015, p. 510].    
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The capital markets have been in a state of flux since the 1700s when a national 
market in government bonds was established in the U.K. to finance the costs of war, notably 
with France and America [Michie, 2016]. Developments in telegraph and telephone 
technology facilitated the creation of the first truly global securities market by the time of the 
First World War “in which money could be moved around the world in response to minute 
changes in supply and demand” [ibid., p. 251]. Advances in telecommunications and 
computing technologies further allowed markets to become fully electronic during the 1990s. 
Added to that, there have been the vicissitudes of two world wars and the shifting sands of 
enhanced and reduced regulation by governments. The pace of change has quickened in the 
period since the 1980s, which has witnessed a mushrooming in the number of markets and 
types of securities traded, especially those sold over-the-counter. Other developments during 
the last thirty years include a coalescing of exchanges and a growing dominance of the global 
banks, which though themselves supervised and regulated, can bypass the regulated 
exchanges in the transaction of their business through the interbank trading networks that 
have been created: 
These banks possessed the ability to route their orders to whatever market they 
chose or match transactions internally, and to integrate the issue and trading of 
securities into the entire range of financial activities they were engaged in 
[ibid., p. 258]. 
 
Likewise, Zimmerman [2015] points to the relatively recent rise of private equity (PE) and 
venture capital (VC), which is again conducted outside the regulated exchanges. At what 
point developments in the markets brought about the purported decline in the significance of 
stewardship to investors is therefore hard to specify. Indeed, the increase in business 
conducted outside the regulated exchanges, whether it be internal bank dealings [Michie, 
2016], VC financed start-ups, or PE-backed buyout deals [Zimmerman, 2015], points to a 
rising demand for stewardship information in the 21st century.  
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This impression of disconnectedness to changes in the marketplace is corroborated by 
Zeff’s [2013] analysis of the various pronouncements and theoretical writings on the 
objectives of financial reporting over the last 90 years. He dates the appearance of the idea of 
“decision-usefulness” in accounting to the 1950s [p. 276]. However, the stance taken by 
CS#8 in 2010 in subsuming the stewardship objective within decision-usefulness comes as a 
surprise as it is not foreshadowed by the preceding writings cited in the paper. These tend to 
be wider in their conception of the economic-decisions and user-groups served by the 
accounts than CS#8, and see stewardship as playing a distinct accounting function even in 
cases where that is perceived as being subsidiary to the decision-usefulness one.23 
Finally, the argument that stewardship information has declined in importance to 
investors, who stand to make financial losses if businesses fail, is undermined by the number 
of accounting scandals. To cite but two examples, Burrough and Helyar [1990] report the 
case of RJR Nabisco, which maintained a fleet of 10 private aircraft and 36 company pilots, 
to which the CEO Ross Johnson’s friends and dog had access. Tirole [2006, Ch. 1] refers to 
the Tyco case in 2002, in which the CEO and others are estimated to have stolen over $100 
million. Indeed, it could well be argued that the 2007/2009 financial crisis was more the 
result of a failure to establish proper incentives than to a lack of information: junk mortgages 
were known at time of issue as NINJA loans, meaning “no-income, no-job, no-assets,” but 
banks had established incentives to generate high volumes of loan business and sell it on 
using credit default swaps [Hull, 2012, Ch. 8]. The incentives for lenders to responsibly issue 
loan products and for credit-rating agencies to properly assess complex portfolios of asset-
backed securities have been subjected to extensive criticism, as has the performance of 
regulators in providing adequate oversight and of politicians in crafting public policy 
[Sowell, 2009; Kling, 2009a, 2009b; Wallison, 2016]. 
                                                 
23 See for example FASB (1978, par. 50). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The paper has analyzed FASB and IASB’s decision not to treat the motivational and 
control aspects of stewardship accounting as a separate and distinct reporting objective to that 
of facilitating decisions. It has done so firstly by considering the demand for information to 
control agents, concentrating on the pre-regulation period as a means of controlling for 
regulatory pressure; and secondly by assessing the capacity of decision-useful information to 
replicate stewardship effects historically. The paper has argued that an essence to accounting 
exists based on the legal protection of property rights, encompassing stewardship, which has 
remained constant since earliest times. 
The standards boards’ reluctance to recognize the motivational and control aspects of 
stewardship information is out of alignment with economic theory, which regards this 
function as conceptually distinct from the decision-usefulness one. However, the boards’ 
might still be justified in taking this approach if it could be shown that information which is 
useful for decisions is also capable of substituting for stewardship. To explore this possibility, 
the paper considered situations where the two types of information have acted as 
complements to each other.  
The historical evidence suggests that while cases exist where decision-useful 
information has been used to supplement the existing accountability arrangements within 
organizations, it has not proved capable of acting as a substitute. The stumbling block is the 
need for stewardship information to be capable of verification if it is to be effective, which is 
problematic for decision-useful information owing to its forwards looking nature. Systems 
tend to break down when the verifiability of data is compromised, and accounting history 
provides many examples of the destabilizing consequences that result. 
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Finally, the paper has considered the general applicability of its findings given its 
focus on the pre-regulation period. In particular, there is the argument that developments in 
the capital markets over the last hundred years have lessened the demand for stewardship 
information by investors to the point where it can be ignored by standard setters as a 
reporting objective. However, this understanding of events falls down when one considers the 
nature and frequency of the changes, which would make it hard to identify when this situation 
occurred. The succession of writings on reporting objectives preceding CS#8 corroborates 
this view because they show that the decision of FASB/IASB to exclude stewardship in 2010 
to be a new departure. Indeed, the rise in trading outside the regulated exchanges in the late 
20th and early 21st centuries points to an increase in the relevance of stewardship information 
to investors rather than a decline. This impression of disconnectedness to market reality is 
reinforced by the frequent occurrence of accounting scandals that shows no signs of abating.  
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